NATO infantry operations veteran Major (retd) Mark Takacs (lead image) has published an animated map analysis of the battles between Russian and Ukrainian forces around Sudzha, in the Kursk region, between March 5 and 14. Nothing comparable has been reported by the Russian military bloggers; their US copyists; or the Ukrainian and British propaganda agencies.
Without the intention on Takacs’ part, his military analysis reveals the reason for the announcement of the “immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire” on March 11 in Jeddah by the US and Ukrainian delegations, after the plan had been composed by UK and US officials in Kiev over the previous weekend. This is to restore command and control communications with the Ukrainian units still occupying about 20% of the Kursk territory they had taken last August; restore and refill the primary NO7 highway and secondary routes into the Kursk salient for supplies of fresh arms, ammunition and troops; and construct new defence lines and fortifications which had either failed or been missing during the Russian offensive movements of the previous week.
A parallel plan for the salients southward down the line of contact is likely, although Takacs has yet to analyse them. In short, the ceasefire has been proposed to continue the war, not to end it.
“The control of Ukrainian troops inside this incursion zone [Kursk] has been lost,” President Vladimir Putin said on March 13. “At the initial stages, just a week or two ago, Ukrainian servicemen tried to get out of there in small groups. Now it is impossible. They are trying to get out in very small groups of two or three men because everything is under our complete fire control…If this area is physically blocked in the next few days, then no one will be able to leave. There will only be two options: surrender or die. I think in these conditions it would be good for the Ukrainian side to achieve a ceasefire for at least 30 days. We are also in favour of it, but there are nuances. What are they?”
“First, what will we do about the incursion section in the Kursk Region? What would that mean if we cease fire for 30 days? Does this mean that everyone who is in there will just walk out without a fight? Do we have to let them go after they committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians? Or will the Ukrainian leadership issue a command for them to lay down their arms and just surrender? How will this happen? It is not clear.”
In his week-long record of the Kursk battlefield, Takacs corroborates Putin’s description that the Ukrainian forces have been cut off by successful Russian military operations. But Takacs indicates that despite the disruption of their communications and their supply routes, they have been able to hold on to their positions despite Russian air superiority, drone and artillery fire control, and a five to one numerical superiority of infantrymen.
Takacs also reveals he has found no evidence that the Ukrainian operations were adversely affected by the Washington press release announcing the “pause” in US intelligence sharing with the Ukrainian forces starting on March 5, and ending with the press release of resumption on March 11.
Earlier, on March 4, Takacs reported he was taking the pause seriously: “Much of the minute-accurate tactical intelligence data (0-20/30 km deep behind the enemy’s perimeter) comes from US technical intelligence sources. Of course, the Ukrainians also operate tactical reconnaissance systems, but mainly they cannot see into the areas behind the Russian brigades and beyond to the depth of the division without the Americans. This is a problem because Russian operations can be predicted by 12-36 hours (so even the often mentioned shift-of-gravity attack method can be avoided) if there is accurate information about these terrain sections. If this is not the case, then the Ukrainian defence will be at a significant disadvantage.”
His subsequent assessment records no US pause, no Ukrainian disadvantage.
Another NATO campaign veteran comments on Takacs’s report: “There’s no mention of the supposed American support cut-off as a contributory factor in the Ukrainian defeat. Instead, we can see that on the Russian side, superior electronic warfare, persistent and patient preparation over several months, tactical surprise, and bravery (the Pipe Operation), and Ukrainian negligence are given credit for the Russian victory.”
The Takacs report also raises a question which Russian analysts and their American copyists have been reluctant to ask: why, with overwhelming air, ground and firepower superiority against the Ukrainians, and the months-long preparation of the operational plans, has the Russian offensive been so slow?
Watch the 20-minute Takacs video by clicking here.
Takacs explains he has served as an officer in the Hungarian Army up to the rank of major when he resigned in April 2024. His experience included five years of mechanized infantry field operations and five years as a military academy trainer of officers at the battalion and brigade levels. For rank and field experience compared to US military bloggers on the Ukraine war, Takacs is the equal of Major Scott Ritter; he is junior to Colonel Douglas Macgregor; he outranks Andrei Martyanov and the pseudonymous army NCO Simplicius.
