President Vladimir Putin gave a party rally speech in Moscow on Saturday in which he omitted to mention seven of the eight domestic issues most troubling Russian voters – inflation; high interest-rate caused stagnation in the economy; corruption; low quality education; poor public health care; terrorism; and illegal immigrants.
He made an exception for the Special Military Operation and “the front to fight for the Motherland”.
To Russians who tell pollsters the protracted war and the casualty rate are their biggest concerns, Putin said not to worry — he and his party are taking care of both: “The United Russia party has been supporting our troops literally from the first day of the special military operation: it submits important draft laws to create legal and social guarantees for our heroes and their families; assists the recovery of the liberated regions; collects and delivers everything the civilians there need. The party also does much for the veterans who are back from the combat areas, helps them realise themselves in civilian professions, in public and political life.”
Reading methodically without departing from his script, Putin told delegates at the 22nd Congress of United Russia that the party stands for “the unity of people, faith in the country and in our victory…the desire to ensure the safety of the Motherland, to protect our sacred historical memory, spirituality, traditions. This is political boilerplate — and it’s bullet-proof. The polls reinforce Putin’s message with the assurance that Russian voters see and fancy no alternative.
In the current State Duma, elected in September 2021 to a five-year term, United Russia holds 324 of the 450 seats. The opposition is led by the Community Party with 57 seats; Just Russia with 28, and New People with 16. In the Levada polling, support for United Russia is stable at 42%; the other political parties are polling between 4% and 10%.
Left: Party representation in the current Duma; click on source to enlarge: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Duma
Right: Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. For background and analysis of Mishustin’s performance since he replaced Dmitry Medvedev in January 2020, read this.
No other Russian politician represents a challenge to the president; he does not face a new election until 2030. Public approval for Putin remains at 87% according to the Levada Centre; 79% according to the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), and stable. There is no government or party figure drawing current voter support in opposition, and no public canvassing for the succession.
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov trail after Putin in the polls but far behind; their political profiles and approval ratings are based on the frequency of their media appearances. But public trust for them is a fraction of Putin’s rating, and they are not candidates to succeed him. Trust in former President Dmitry Medvedev is a fraction of that for Mishustin and Lavrov because Medvedev – though head of the United Russia party and deputy head of the Security Council — is almost invisible in the mainstream media.
Source: https://www.levada.ru/
The general public mood, as measured by Levada between November 2 and 27, is overwhelmingly positive and confident – 72% of Russians believe the country is going in the right direction; only 18% think it’s headed in the wrong direction.
In this domestic atmosphere, Putin is calculating there is no good reason for him to mention the Russian military withdrawal from Syria, or to answer press questions of why he decided to evacuate Russian bases in the country, allow Israel to destroy Syria’s military and industrial infrastructure, and accept Israeli, Turkish and American takeover of Syria’s sovereignty, territory, and natural wealth, particularly water and oil.
A Moscow source comments: “I think the Russian public will not be convinced to risk a presence there especially when the propaganda has changed its tune to the line, ‘it’s impossible to help those who can’t help themselves.’ With Syrian statehood gone, this battle is lost.”
This is the rationale, several Moscow sources believe, for Putin to cut his losses and run from Syria without risking the appearance to Russian voters of having done either. The military and strategic implications of Putin’s decision-making on Syria, argued behind closed doors with the General Staff, are unmentioned in the Duma and the media.
The Moscow source adds: “What happens in Ukraine and when are the main questions now. There could well be more surprises from the US. There might be a new ground assault into Russian territory and continuing missile attacks deep into Russian territory. So far, these are not disturbing the national mood of confidence and optimism. So for the time being Russians are not expecting and are not prepared for any escalation on any front – at least not on the ground. If Putin can negotiate to keep the four [Donbass] regions and a demilitarisation accord with [President Donald] Trump, there will be what the Defense Ministry calls retaliation, but no escalation. At least not for now, not for six months after Trump takes office if the talks head nowhere.”
“What is needed now from Russian point of view is time to build the army and the economy for a bigger war. That, according to everyone I talk with, is going to be war with Turkey when the stakes will be much higher than they are with Ukraine. Putin is adopting a wait-and-see stance.”Russian military sources believe that Putin and the General Staff have agreed to restrict their operations to electric war targeting; to avoid decapitation strikes at the Ukrainian leadership or US, French and British forces operating long-range Ukrainian missile units; and to characterize current air operations as “retaliation”, not “escalation”.
Map of Russian missile and drone strikes against electric grid targets, principally in western Ukraine, December 13.
In Beijing last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping told Dmitry Medvedev that his advice to Putin is “no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party”. Medvedev agreed.
A western veteran of electric war operations comments on the latest Russian strikes of December 13: “every time the aftermath is worse. More outages, longer duration, more misery for Ukrainians. Rail capacity and fuel storage are degrading as well. There’s a consistency in the General Staff’s operational thinking that’s been maintained since the start of the electric war. Draw in the enemy from outside of Ukraine, smash their equipment, kill their volunteers, immiserate and break the Ukrainians. It’s slow, but it’s working.”
“The paradox of this Russian success is that the more the General Staff beats NATO and the Ukrainians, the more they commit to the war. The more Putin applies the brakes, the more encouraged they are.”
