Russia Doesn’t Believe in Carrots or Sticks – It Believes in Time, by John Helmer

President Donald Trump has asked President Vladimir Putin to assist him in arranging a grand Middle East peace deal. This, according to officials leaking to Bloomberg reporters, requires Iran to agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, and also “Iran’s support for its allied groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East.”

The leakers, “people with knowledge of the situation, asking not to be identified”, according to Bloomberg, reportedly did not ask Putin to mediate the restoration of the Pahlavi monarchy.

The news agency story follows by three weeks the White House announcement on February 4 of “a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad. The NSPM establishes that: Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered. The NSPM directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose maximum economic pressure on the Government of Iran, including by sanctioning or imposing enforcement mechanisms on those acting in violation of existing sanctions.”

The US officials briefing Bloomberg claim that after his big stick move, Trump made two small carrot moves in the direction of the Russians. On February 12, Trump told Putin on the telephone that he had a deal to end the war in the Ukraine if Putin would help with a deal to end Iran’s war in the Middle East.

Trump then told Secretary of State Marco Rubio to say more when he met in Riyadh with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Riyadh on February 18. Whatever the Americans say they said, Lavrov omitted to mention it in the communiqué and press briefing in Riyadh.

During his subsequent meetings in Teheran on February 25, Lavrov was explicit – almost — in opposing Trump’s stick-wielding. “We underscored the inadmissibility of unilateral economic sanctions,” Lavrov announced after meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. “We will continue substantive and focused efforts to mitigate the adverse effects of these unlawful restrictions on the economies of Russia and Iran…We have discussed at length the developments around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We remain convinced that the diplomatic resource is still there and should not be left unused. Instead, it should be engaged as effectively as possible and no threats or allusions to forceful solutions should be made. We are committed to continuing the search for acceptable solutions to the situation at hand which was created by our Western colleagues, not Iran.”

Since the refusal of Kremlin support for Iran’s military alliance with Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus last November and December, the subsequent recriminations between Teheran and Moscow have not been entirely or clearly resolved. For the record of the recriminations, click; for the attempt to resolve them in the January treaty signing, read this; for the continuing irresolution, look again.

On Friday, March 7, Trump said he believes Putin will do more for Trump’s Ukraine “deal” than the Kremlin is admitting publicly. “I think he’s going to be more generous than he has to be, and that’s pretty good.” Is this true? Is it an American attempt to sow suspicion and distrust in Moscow between the General Staff and the Kremlin? Is it also aimed at splitting the Iranians from the Russians?

Lavrov’s announcement after his meeting with President Pezeshkian was non-committal on the concessions Trump wants from Iran for denuclearization and withdrawal of support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansar Allah (Houthis). “During the exchange of views on pressing global and regional issues, the focus was placed on the evolving situations in Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone, and matters pertaining to the Caspian region. The sides coordinated their positions regarding the state of affairs surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme,” the Russian communiqué announced after Lavrov met with Pezeshkian.

“Coordination” is a camouflage term in the current Russian-Iranian relationship. It appears 71 times in the January pact Pezeshkian signed in Moscow with Putin. Its meaning, Russian sources believe, carries outer ambiguity, inner secrecy – also uncertainty under the pressure Trump is applying.

A Russian source in a position to know believes the strategic consensus in Moscow, and also at the Ukraine front, is that “the empire [US] won’t stop its war with Russia. But we need time to correct the tactical mistakes that have been made. Trump’s peace is going to be short-lived. Maybe five years, maybe eight. There’s no point fighting him at every step. We’ll try to get the best deal possible that leaves him thinking he looks good. After losing eight years, Russia wants to gain eight years.”

A military source comments that in the short run the more confusion Trump and his officials create, the more time the Russian General Staff has to accelerate the military offensive westward from the current line of contact towards Kiev. “The American learning disability is showing across the board,” he says. “The kettle is now on the boil in Sumy. The Ukrainians are cut off in Kursk and don’t have much more time left. East of the Dnieper, it’s apparent that Putin’s foot is off the brake.”

The US side is now calling time. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz has announced that he, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Steven Witkoff will return for negotiations with their Russian counterparts in Riyadh next week. The Kiev regime has announced they will be meeting the US delegation on Tuesday.

As Russians report, analyse, and debate the implications of policy-making by press release and tweet from Trump and his officials, Moscow sources acknowledge what physicists have long recognized as the Observer Effect. The closer the observer and his methodology gets to the object or target, the more disturbance is created, the less clear visibility of the object, and the more unpredictability of how it will behave.

This is intentional on Trump’s part, the sources believe – it’s his idea of how to conduct deal-making. Uncertainty and confusion are also the condition in which Trump’s officials find themselves, competing with each other for factional policy positions, influence at the White House, and personal power. For the time being, the Russian response to Trump’s Ukraine end-of-war deal and also his Iran and Middle East end-of-war deal is – the sources emphasize — to delay, wait and see.

TRUMP’S CLOCK — MARCH 4

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com
The Bloomberg report can be listened to here.

TRUMP’S CLOCK — MARCH 7: 1:40 PM (WASHINGTON, DC, TIME)
““I think he’s going to be more generous than he has to be, and that’s pretty good.” https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/1898067296393851225

TRUMP’S CLOCK — MARCH 7, 5:17 PM (WASHINGTON TIME)

Source: https://truthsocial.com/

Responding to the Bloomberg report, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: “”Russia believes that the United States and Iran should resolve all problems through negotiations” and that Moscow “is ready to do everything in its power to achieve this.”

The Iranian response has been similar. “Given the significance of these matters, it’s possible that many parties will show good will and readiness to help with various problems,” Bloomberg reported the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, as saying during a press conference in Teheran on March. “From this perspective, it’s natural that countries will present an offer of help if it’s needed.” Baghaei refused to speak directly with Bloomberg.

In preparing for the coming round of Riyadh talks, the Russian positions on terms for the Ukraine settlement are clearer than the US terms. It is quite the opposite for the terms of the Iranian settlement – the US is clearer than Russia.

To understand how officials in Moscow are thinking, the state-funded internet publication Vzglyad is both a sounding board for different policy factions around the Kremlin and a windvane of the direction Putin is expected to take. Interpreting this new report, published on Friday afternoon, it is necessary to read between the lines where the meaning is reversed.

Source: https://vz.ru/world/2025/3/7/1318799.html

March 7, 2025
Russia’s response to the US request requires caution
By Gevorg Mirzayan

“This is evidence of a general warming of relations between Moscow and Washington.” With these words, experts assess reports that Washington has asked Moscow to mediate in negotiations with Iran. Such mediation opens up both opportunities and dangers for Russia. What is this about?

The United States needs Russian help in normalizing relations with Iran. This is reported by the American publication, Bloomberg. According to its sources, Donald Trump voiced the relevant request during his talks with Vladimir Putin on February 12, and then US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed it at their meeting in Saudi Arabia.

The logic of the American side is clear. Despite Trump’s dislike of Iranians, he has no time for conflict with the Islamic Republic right now – there is neithertime, energy, nor desire for this. “For the Trump administration, any reduction in tensions with … Iran could be a victory, as it would not have to focus on the Middle East,” writes The Jerusalem Post.

On the other hand, the United States cannot let the situation with Iran take its course either. After the failure in Syria, the Iranians feel vulnerable – and, according to Western media, they are accelerating the process of creating a nuclear bomb as their ultimate weapon of defense.

At the same time, there is now a unique chance to resolve all the problems peacefully, partly because Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is also a proponent of a diplomatic solution to the conflict. And the defeat in Syria, multiplied by the economic crisis in the country, allows him and his supporters to “sell” a compromise with the United States as the best solution to all problems.

It is clear that Washington and Teheran cannot speak directly, which means that an intermediary is needed. Influential and at the same time honest, whose word is trusted by both sides. That is, Russia.

“The United States understands that negotiations with Iran will be difficult, and therefore, not wanting to greatly increase the number of intermediaries, they turned to Russia.”

“They took into account Moscow’s good relations with Teheran, as well as Russia’s proven ability to manoeuvre between various players,” says Yelena Suponina, an international political scientist and expert at the Russian International Affairs Council.

Yelena Suponina speaking (in Arabic) at the Emirates Policy Centre.

Moscow neither confirms nor denies the American request for cooperation. “I cannot confirm, but I said that, in general, Putin has repeatedly said that the problem of the Iranian nuclear dossier should be solved exclusively by peaceful means. Russia, being an ally and partner of Iran, is ready to do everything possible to facilitate this process,” said Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for the Russian president.

[Russia wants] to contribute not only because it is beneficial to an ally, but also because Russia does not need a war in the Middle East, nor nuclear proliferation, which will increase if Teheran gets a nuclear bomb. And finally, to contribute because it is beneficial to Russia. Such mediation enhances its role in the Middle East, and also makes it an important and necessary partner for Washington.

However, we must not forget about the risks of such mediation. “This proposal is evidence of the general warming of relations between Moscow and Washington, but such proposals should be treated very carefully,” adds Suponina.

“Firstly, because the level of distrust between the parties is enormous. And it’s not just about Iranian-American relations. Washington – and this is not surprising after so many years of conflict – does not trust Moscow either. But trust in an intermediary is a key condition for successful negotiations. Moscow is also not sure that Washington will comply with the agreements reached under its leadership.”

“Secondly, there is an unstable domestic political situation in both countries. Donald Trump has actually declared war on a significant part of the American foreign policy establishment, and it is far from certain that he will win it. The Iranian leadership is also split, including into supporters and opponents of negotiations with the Americans. And not only with the Americans, but also personally with Trump, the man who withdrew from the previous peace deal (concluded under Barack Obama), and also ordered the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the most popular figure on the Iranian street.”

“At the same time, the serious state of health of the country’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei creates additional uncertainty – no one knows who will be chosen as the successor and what policy position this successor will take. And this uncertainty, both in the United States and in Iran, does not allow us to enter into any serious, long–term deals right now.”

“Thirdly, the position of the key American allies in the region, the Israelis, cannot be ignored. “Israel has a very negative attitude towards the idea of peace talks with Iran. And Trump himself is unpredictable. Therefore, it is possible that if the negotiations break down at some stage, he will take into account Benjamin Netanyahu’s idea of forceful solutions to the Iranian issue,” says Suponina.

Finally, Iran’s skepticism about the warming of Russian-American relations should be taken into account.

A number of politicians and experts in Teheran believe that Russia, in exchange for concessions from the United States, will be able to distance itself from allied relations with Iran. And neither the recently signed strategic agreement, nor the statements of the Russian leadership, nor elementary common sense (dictating that no one should change a strategic partner for American promises) can convince them. And Russia’s attempts to mediate, as well as generally discuss the Iranian issue in negotiations with the Americans, may strengthen these suspicions and, therefore, harm bilateral relations.

At the same time, there are always risks – they are the flip side of opportunities. And Russian diplomacy has repeatedly proven its ability to sail safely between the reefs of world politics.