The Duran presented on October 17 an excellent discussion between John Helmer and Gilbert Doctorow moderated by Alexander Mercouris about how Russian military and civilian decisions are made. The knowledge I gained enables me to update my take on the situation, which I will now do.
The Ukrainian invasion of Kursk, which has been defeated, was a game changer and possibly will result in the termination of Ukraine as an independent country. The reason is that the invasion convinced the Russian public, the General Staff of the Russian military, and buttressed the case of Russian politicians that an independent Ukraine is inconsistent with Russian security.
Putin still says he is open to negotiations, but only if the other side acknowledges the reality on the ground, which Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” does not do. Zelensky says only nukes or NATO can save Ukraine. The Russians will not allow either.
If the Russian Army stops at the Dnieper River, that leaves western Ukraine as a US/NATO missile platform. Stopping at the Dnieper River leaves Putin no way to de-militarize and de-Nazify Ukraine. It would limit his declared goals only to preventing the Russian populations attached by Soviet leaders to Ukraine from being slaughtered by anti-Russian Ukrainian forces.
It seems that Putin overlooked that dispelling Ukrainian military forces from Donbas does not de-militarize Ukraine or prevent Ukraine from being a member of NATO. Putin will have reincorporated former Russian territory back into Russia, but western Ukraine would still be there as a platform for US nukes and from which to trade missile strikes with Russia as Israel and Iran are doing.
The question is whether Putin, who wants peace, will be content with liberating eastern and southern Russian territories of Ukraine, and, if so, whether the Russian public and the General Staff will permit him to leave a Ukrainian state in place or will they see a deal as merely kicking the can down the road.
There is also the question who Putin can negotiate with. Zelensky’s term as president has expired. On what authority is Zelensky still in charge? Putin cannot know whether a deal he makes with Zelensky will later be ruled illegitimate. One would think that Putin has learned from the Minsk Agreement, which was used to deceive him and to leave him unprepared for military action, and all Russian agreements with Washington–such as the promise that NATO will not move one inch to the East –that any agreement with Washington’s signature on it is worthless. So, how is it that Putin speaks of negotiations? Is Putin delusional and unable to learn from experience?
I see Putin as a successful leader. He has rescued Russia from demoralization from the Soviet collapse, which resulted in a once powerful state being dismembered, looted and embarrassed by its Jewish oligarchs and Washington.
Putin has rebuilt the Russian economy, despite Washington’s sanctions and Putin’s incompetent central bank director.
Putin has restored Russian pride, the Russian family, and civil morality.
He is a rare successful leader.
But as a war leader he has been Putin the Unready, caught off guard by the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia organized by Washington, by Washington’s overthrow of the Ukrainian government, and by the West’s response to his Special Military Operation in Donbas. Putin has accepted insult after insult, provocation after provocation, thus ever-widening the conflict and inviting more conflicts elsewhere as in the Middle East.
It is unclear to me why Putin accepted Washington’s overthrow of the Ukrainian government. Did he simply lack the military resources to prevent it, or was he unable to understand what was happening? The conflict that occurred 8 years later was the consequence of Putin’s failure to read the writing on the wall.
Perhaps he was constrained by the treasonous class, the worshipers of the West, traitors I refer to as “Atlanticist Integrationists.” These traitors are now referred to in Russia as “the Fifth Column.” For the most part they are gone, except for the Russian central bank director, who continues to do Russia more harm than the West does.
I think the explanation of Putin’s behavior is that Putin understands that war between Washington and Russia means end times, and he wants to avoid that at all costs. Thus, his willingness to accept endless insults and provocations. But what Putin does not seem to understand is that Washington is relentless in its efforts to impose its agenda of Washington’s hegemony, and that Russia, China and Iran are obstacles in the way of this agenda and, therefore, are to be eliminated. Putin might regard such an agenda as preposterous, but it is nevertheless the agenda. Washington is yet to announce the abandonment of the Wolfowitz Doctrine of American hegemony and unilateralism. As long as this is Washington’s agenda, no understanding signed with Washington has any meaning. As long as Putin continues to accept Washington’s aggression, the aggression will continue.
Putin’s acceptance of provocations have gone so far that the West no longer believes his threats. Both the outgoing and incoming NATO Secretary Generals said that we need pay no attention to whatever Putin says as he never means it.
Did Putin understand that this was the price of endlessly accepting provocations? Did he understand that he was destroying the credibility of his warnings?
Putin, trying to avoid war, has repeated the same mistake in the Middle East.
I was heartened when suddenly Putin showed proactive capability and quickly moved the Russian Air Force into Syria, thus preventing the American war criminal, Obama, from invading Syria. I concluded, wrongly, that Russia had decided to bring Washington’s aggression to a halt. But it was only a one time deal.
Putin, trying to avoid war by leaving Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah without air protection, achieved the opposite–the onset of war. Now, according to reports, Putin is scrambling to get air protection to Iran before Israel blows up Iran’s peaceful nuclear reactors, thus spreading radiation over wide areas of Russia.
Putin and the Russian General Staff failed to comprehend what happens in the absence of countervailing power. The result is not a damper put on war but the outbreak of war, with Putin now having to issue hard warnings to Israel, warnings that might have no credibility in light of Putin’s past failure to enforce red lines.
Awareness is descending on Russia that the existence of Ukraine as an independent country is an existential threat to Russia. The liberation of Donbas does not demilitarize and deNazify Ukraine or replace Ukraine’s puppet government with an independent one.
Will the Russian public and the Russian General Staff permit Putin to agree to end the war simply on the basis of the liberation of Donbas, or will the Russian public and the General Staff insist that Ukraine’s existence is an existential threat to Russia’s existence and insist that the war continue until Ukraine is again a province of Russia?
The Russian Fifth Column is busy at work disputing Zbigniew Brzezinski’s conclusion that Russia cannot be a great power if Ukraine is not part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Will the General Staff and the Russian population agree with the Fifth Column or with Brzezinski? If they agree with Brzezinski, they will object to Putin merely kicking the can down the road with a peace deal. It will be unfortunate if Putin’s insistence on peace destabilizes Russia.
