Axios recently reported that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer “lashed out” at U.S. hostage envoy Adam Boehler in a “tense” phone call for negotiating with terror group Hamas for the return of a kidnapped U.S. citizen.
In February, the U.S. informed Israel of its intent, Israel advised against it, but the U.S. went ahead anyway. The Americans likely felt that the fate of Israeli-American Edan Alexander is their responsibility, or there may have been a lack of confidence is Israel’s leadership. Whatever the reason, Washington acted and Tel Aviv reacted.
Boehler described the U.S.-Hamas meeting: “I think it was a very helpful meeting. It was very helpful to hear some back and forth,” and defended the talks, “… we’re the United States. We’re not an agent of Israel. We have specific interests at play.” The latter must have been distressing to Israel as Boehler, who is Jewish, was echoing another Jewish Trump envoy, Steven Witkoff, who mocked Netanyahu’s non-availability on the Sabbath and forced him to meet at Witkoff’s convenience to discuss a Gaza cease-fire. Israeli officials were likely worried that Jewish-American officials were acting too American and so had to make an example of Boehler.
Boehler was gracious towards Israel and congratulated them for their recent tactical successes but left open the possibility the U.S. might engage with Hamas in the future. He indicated a deal between Hamas and Israel for “all the hostages” with possible “within weeks,” a break with American practice where diplomatic encounters aren’t for “back and forth” but to deliver surrender terms.
Israeli media took note, stood at attention, and reported that Boehler faced “scrutiny,” was “complacent, confused and dangerously naïve,” and decried the Boehler-Hamas honeymoon “behind Israel’s back.”
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the talks were the “right thing” to do, and President Trump defended the talks, claiming they would benefit Israel by returning Israeli hostages, but that’s assuming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s priority is the return of the hostages. Finally, Secretary of State Marco Rubio tried to tamp things down by saying the talks were a “one-off” that “hasn’t borne fruit.”
In the U.S., Trump’s former ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, declared “Talking to Hamas is beneath U.S. dignity,” proving it’s possible to hang around an embassy for four years and not learn anything.
The National Review wailed Trump “has broken with all precedent’ by talking to Hamas, forgetting breaking with precedent is why he was elected.
The Wall Street Journal fretted the Hamas talks “further inflames Israel’s concerns,” but the Journal gave the game away in the same story: “…Hamas had offered a five- to 10-year truce under which it would release all hostages in exchange for all Palestinian prisoners, lay down its arms, allow the U.S. and others to ensure the removal of its vast tunnel system, and withdraw from politics” and “…Hamas continues to press for talks over a permanent end to the fighting and releasing all the hostages…” That would be bad news indeed for the War Party in Washington and Tel Aviv.
In a sign the Journal was worried, the editorial board weighed in the same day with pious concern the two envoys, Witkoff and Boehler, may forget to compare notes and be snookered by those rug dealers from Gaza.
The War Party’s real concern is the Hamas offer of a five-to-10-year truce with Israel. As Boehler noted, “They [Hamas] suggested a five-year to 10-year truce, where Hamas would lay down all … weapons, and where the United States would help, as well as other countries, ensure that there’s no tunnels, there’s nothing taken on the military side, and that Hamas is not involved in politics going forward.” He also noted Hamas proposed some “reasonable” and “workable” actions, and the conversations were “not a bad first offer.”
A cease fire and the return of the hostages are great ideas but Netanyahu’s concerns are staying out of jail, and keeping his coalition in power, so he needs to see how a cessation of hostilities will keep him out of jug.
The U.S. reliance on Israel is an example of the principal-agent problem, the conflict in interests between a principal (U.S.) and agent (Israel): “The problem worsens when there is a greater discrepancy of interests and information between the principal and agent, as well as when the principal lacks the means [or the will] to punish the agent.”
The U.S. made the same mistake when it allowed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to manage the distribution of aid to the mujahideen who fought the Red Army in Afghanistan from 1979-1989. ISI ensured most of the aid went to its favored Islamist clients, setting the stage for the 1989-1992 Afghan civil war, and much of the violence that continues to this day.
In this case, Trump wants the return of the American hostages, and would welcome a truce, and a follow-on deal to The Abraham Accords, so he can turn America’s attention to China. Israel needs instability in the region to keep the Americans involved, and to avoid making any deal with the Palestinians, and fears the Americans will lose interest when all the American hostages are returned. So, it is in Israel’s interest the Americans are returned last, or never.
Israel is a friendly foreign country, but the key words are “foreign country.” The U.S. and Israel have many common interests but not identical interests and Trump’s confession, “I don’t trust anybody,” is a healthy attitude dealing with anyone in politics, especially friends with high expectations.
Why is Hamas a problem? Where did it come from?
Hamas is a Cold War creation, founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (and funded by Israel) in 1987, at the start of the First Intifada, to oppose the secular, nationalist Fatah organization, run by Yasser Arafat. The group is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hamas opposed the peace efforts between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Hamas also opposed the Oslo Accords when rival Fatah renounced violence and recognized the existence of Israel as part of a two-state solution.
According to journalist Seymour Hersh, Netanyahu made a deal with Qatar that it would fund Hamas because “Bibi was convinced that he would have more control over Hamas with the Qatari money” and “you can create a Frankenstein and keep control of it.” Netanyahu’s plan was to divide power between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which was controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and “most of the time, Israeli policy was to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset.”
It was good while it lasted and, in 2019, Netanyahu put it out there: “Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas,” Netanyahu told his Likud party’s Knesset members in March 2019. “This is part of our strategy.”
In a recent interview, Qatar’s prime minister admitted the country hosted the office of Hamas (and the Taliban political office) at the request of the U.S. So, Israel, and the U.S. are responsible for the current state of affairs, but the Americans want to change the state of play while the Israelis want to continue the status quo.
Qatar has come in for its share of criticism over its choice of friends, but the al-Thani don’t just have the receipts, they have the 4K, so any past visitors from Washington and Tel Aviv will have to mind their manners lest they be the star of some embarrassing (and believable) exposes on prime-time Aljazeera.
So, again, why talk to Hamas? To gather information about Hamas officials; to seek differences among Hamas factions; lay the groundwork for future talks; and hedge in case a Hamas interlocutor is a future political leader.
However, any progress attributable to engaging with Hamas may be bad luck for the responsible Hamas figure as he will probably be targeted by Israel to close off any channels or eliminate figures with known views or the potential to compromise.
In June 2024, Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas political bureau, and as “moderate” a figure as could be found in the Hamas ranks. Not a good guy but a known quantity.
And in the 1980s, U.S. influence suffered when Israeli killed, Ali Hassan Salameh, a bad man but the top Palestinian source of the Central Intelligence Agency. Salameh was tipped as a potential future leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and would have been valuable to U.S. efforts to secure peace in the region, so, Israel reasoned, he had to go.
The U.S. happily dealt with South African leader Nelson Mandela, though he was on the terrorist watch list until 2008, and had no qualms about former Irish Republican Army figures Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. Then there is the Taliban (the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” and Iran may be a state sponsor of terror but that didn’t stop the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. North Korea is also a state sponsor of terror but Trump visited in 2019, and the U.S. maintains an embassy in terror-supporting Cuba.
The skeptic can be forgiven for thinking the “terrorism” label is just a tool for leverage or what you call the other guy’s weapon of choice, a way to panic low-information voters.
On Friday, Hamas announced it will release Alexander and the remains of four other hostages. Netanyahu’s office responded by accusing Hamas of “manipulation and psychological warfare.” American envoy Witkoff also rejected the Hamas offer as not satisfying his “bridge proposal” to extend the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire.
On Saturday, Hamas clarified its offer and said it would release Alexander and the remains of the other four hostages of Israel implementing their ceasefire agreement.
The Times of Israel reports the Hamas proposal was based on its discussions last week with Boehler, who reportedly just withdrew his nomination for the Senate-confirmed position of Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (probably because of opposition from Senate Republicans), though he will stay involved in hostage affairs for Washington. He’s probably having a good laugh right now.
Washington folded when Tel Aviv complained that an American official was pursuing American interests, demonstrating to Hamas (and everyone else) it will sacrifice a potential diplomatic opening and delay recovering its citizens to satisfy its client, though who the real client here is up for debate.
Israel made clear its fear that the Americans will lose interest when all their countrymen are recovered and so is obstructing the return of Americans. Now that Hamas announced its offer, Netanyahu will look like he’s yielding under Hamas pressure, emboldening his domestic enemies and endangering his coalition.
So, the Americans had an offer from Hamas that included the opening of a 5- to 10-year truce with Israel, the release of all hostages for all Palestinian prisoners, disarmament (of offensive weapons), removal of the tunnel system, and withdrawal from politics. And they seemed to be modeling the right behavior: you always talk to the bad guys because they have the things you need to know, and maybe you can get some other good stuff in return.
But all that’s gone and the Hamas side must be dizzy at the immature behavior in Washington and Tel Aviv, though they will eventually start thinking what looked like fear, opportunism, and ineptitude was really an intentional plan to sacrifice American and Israeli citizens to keep the conflict going.
James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
