To seek a deal on Ukraine is to treat the symptom and to ignore a cure.
‘Doomsters’ is an occasional Russian expression used to categorise commentators that only see the ‘dark side to events’ (a vice quite prevalent during the Soviet era). Marat Khairullin, a highly respected Russian military analyst, says, “Today, a network of mercenary war bloggers has begun another round of moaning – this time about Syria, where apparently everything is lost for Russia”.
“Many see the events in Syria (and some add Georgia to the mix) as attempts to open additional fronts against our country. Perhaps that’s true. But in that case, it’s more appropriate to draw direct parallels with the reckless attack on Kursk, which left the Ukrainian armed forces in an almost hopeless position”.
Khairullin views the activation of this jihadist insurgency in Syria as a similarly ‘desperate’ act. The background is that the Syria-Russia-Iran coalition had – thorough the Astana negotiations – “cornered the remaining Syrian terrorists into a 6,000 sq. km enclave. Without delving into the details, it was a process reminiscent of the [Ukrainian] Minsk Agreements—both sides were utterly exhausted and thus agreed to a ceasefire. Importantly, all sides understood this was only a temporary truce; the contradictions were so profound that no one expected the conflict to end”.
Aleppo fell quickly these past days, as “one division of the Syrian National Army outright defected to the Islamists (read: Americans)”. The defection was a set up. Northern Aleppo was occupied by the Syrian National Army, fully controlled, armed and funded by Turkey, which dominates northern Aleppo.
The key, Khairullin says, is this crucial point: The land is flat criss-crossed by few roads:
“ … whomsoever controls the airspace controls the country. Last year, Russia formed a new aerial unit called the Special Air Corps, reportedly tailored for overseas operations. It consists of four aviation regiments, including a regiment of Su-35s. Currently, just two Su-35s are overseeing the entirety of Syria’s territory. Imagine the impact when 24 such aircraft are deployed. And Russia is fully capable of such a deployment”.
The second crucial point is that “Iran and Russia have drawn closer. At the start of the Syrian war, relations between the two were decidedly ‘neutral-hostile’. By late 2024 however, we now see a very strong alliance. Israel and the U.S., by violating the peace agreements through this Turkish insurrection, have provoked a renewed Iranian presence in Syria: Iran has begun to expand beyond its bases, redeploying additional forces into the country. This gives Assad and his allies a direct pretext to expel the American and Turkish proxies from Aleppo and Idlib. This isn’t speculation — it’s straightforward arithmetic”.
Syria, however, is a key component to the Israeli-American plan to remake the Middle East. Syria is both the supply-line for Hizbullah, as well as a hub of resistance to Israel’s “Greater Israel Project”. Now that the permanent ‘Anglo’ Security State unreservedly is backing Israel’s ambition to assert regional hegemony, the West has okayed Erdogan’s jihadist insurrection against President Assad. The aim is to split Iran from its allies, weaken Assad and to prepare for the putative Iran overthrow. Reportedly, the Turkish initiative was hurriedly brought forward, to fit with Israel’s ceasefire plan.
Khairullin’s point is that this Syria ‘ploy’ is akin to Ukraine’s “reckless attack on Kursk”, which diverted Ukrainian élite forces from the beleaguered Contact Line, and then marooned these forces in an almost hopeless position in Kursk. Instead of weakening Moscow (as intended), ‘Kursk’ inverted NATO’s original objective – by becoming opportunity to eradicate a major portion of Ukraine’s élite forces.
In Idlib, the Islamists (HTS), writes Khairullin, “had gained dominance – imposing a strict Wahhabi regime and infiltrating the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. Both groups are patchwork organizations, with various factions fighting over money, border crossings, drugs, and smuggling. Essentially, it’s a cauldron—not very combat-effective but highly greedy”.
“Our Aerospace Forces obliterated all command centres (bunkers) of Tahrir al-Sham … and there is a strong likelihood that the entire leadership of the group has been decapitated”, notes Khairullin.
The Syrian Army’s main forces are advancing toward Aleppo; meanwhile, the Russian Air Force is bombing relentlessly; its Navy held a large drill off the Syria cost on 3 December with test launches of hypersonic and Kalibr cruise missiles; and Wagner and the Iraqi Hash’ad forces (Iraqi PM forces that are now part of the Iraqi army) are grouping on the ground in support of the Syrian Army.
Israeli Intelligence Chief’s lately have begun to scent problems with this ‘clever initiative’ that dovetails so exactly with Israel’s pause in the Lebanon fighting; With the supply route from Syria cut, Israel then – in theory – would be in a position to commence ‘Part Two’ of its attempted onslaught on Hizbullah.
But wait … Israeli Channel 12 reports the possibility that events in Syria are creating threats against Israel “where Israel would be required to act”.
Shades of ‘Kursk’ – rather than Hizbullah being weakened, Israel adds to its military commitments? Erdogan too, may have wrong-footed himself with this gamble. He has infuriated Moscow and Tehran, and is being flailed at home for siding with the U.S. and America against the Palestinians. Further, he has drawn no Arab support (apart from a Qatari studied ambivalence).
Yes, Erdogan has cards to play in the relationship with Putin (control of naval access to the Black Sea, tourism and energy), but Russia is an ascendant great power and can afford to play some hardball in negotiations with a weakened Erdogan. Iran also has cards to play: ‘You, Erdogan, equipped the jihadists with Ukrainian drones; We can deliver the same to the Kurdish Workers Party’.
In the background is the bellicose language emerging from Team Trump, some of whom take harshly aggressive and hardline positions. These Israel-Firster and hawkish appointees by Trump likely emit their bluster as much to project an image of Trumpist strength to the American public, as to project a substantive project.
Trump is known for waving a big stick – and when he has played that tune for a little while, he slips in from behind, to complete a deal.
So we have had (from Trump): “If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume Office as President of the United States, there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East”.
In the ‘Middle East’? To whom exactly is this addressed? And what does it suggest? (No mention of the thousands of Palestinian detainees and prisoners held by Israel)? Sounds more like Trump has sipped at the Israeli Kool-Aid: ‘All problems derive from Iran’; Israel is the innocent adrift a sea of regional malignity.
Trump’s disciples believe Trump will impose his will to achieve ‘quiet’ in the Middle East – and impose on Putin an end to the Ukraine War. They are convinced Trump can ‘cut a deal’ in the form of an offer to Putin that he cannot refuse. (For, ‘the current ‘owners of the world’ are never going to let China/Russia just waltz in, form BRICS and assume the position of World Hegemon’).
It is a return to the old formula of Zbig Brzezenski: Promise Putin normalisation with U.S. (and Europe) and full sanctions relief, and pull Russia back into the western sphere – severed from a besieged China and Iran (with BRICS scattered to the wind under threat of sanctions).
It fails, however, to take account of how much the world has transitioned in the intervening years since ‘Trump One’. Bluster simply doesn’t carry the effect it used to: America isn’t what it was; nor is it obeyed as it once was.
Does Trump understand this accelerating global metamorphosis (as Will Schryver puts it), that “the only deal to be made with Russia is that of agreeing to the terms Russia dictates”:
“That’s what happens in the real world when you win a big war. And make no mistake, in this war, the Ukrainians have been slaughtered, the U.S./NATO has been humiliated, and the Russians are emerging from it indisputably triumphant, and more powerful on the world stage than they have been since the peak of Soviet strength decades ago”.
In other words, ‘big stick; quick deal’ may not answer to the new world of today.
Putin, in response to a questioner at Astana on 29 November, repeated an earlier warning: “Let me underscore the key point: the essence of our proposal [on Ukraine, given at the Russian Foreign Ministry] is not a temporary truce or ceasefire, as the West might prefer – to allow the Kiev regime to recover, rearm, and prepare for a new offensive. I repeat: we are not discussing freezing the conflict, but its definitive resolution”.
What Putin is saying – very politely – to the West is that: You still ‘don’t get it’. To seek a deal on Ukraine is to treat the symptom and to ignore a cure. The West has its policy back-to-front, in other words. Putin is clear: A definitive solution would be to delineate the frontier between Atlanticist security ‘interest’ and the security interests of the ‘World Island’ (in Mackinder’s terminology): i.e. to settle the security architecture between the ‘Heartland and the Rim-land’. Once that is done, Ukraine falls naturally into its place. It’s at the end of the agenda, not first.
One highly-regarded foreign policy sage, Professor Sergei Karaganov, explains (original only in Russian):
“Our [Russian] goal is to facilitate the U.S.’s incipient retreat, as peaceably as possible, from the position of global hegemon (which it can no longer afford) to the position of a normal great power. And to expel Europe from being any international actor. Let it stew in its own juices …The conclusion is obvious. We must end the current phase of direct military conflict with the West, but not the broader confrontation with it. Trump will offer to ease pressure on Russia (which he cannot guarantee) in exchange for Russia refraining from a close alliance with China. The Trump administration will propose a deal, alternating threats with promises … but the U.S. already understands that it cannot win. America will remain an unreliable partner for the foreseeable future. Fundamental normalization of our relations with the U.S. should not be expected in the coming decade. Trump’s hands are tied by the Russophobia fanned by liberals for years. The inertia of the Cold War is still quite strong, and so are anti-Russian feelings among most Trumpists”.
“The foremost goal of the current war should be the decisive defeat in Ukraine of Europe’s rising revanchism. This is a war to ward off World War III and to prevent the restoration of the Western yoke. The initial negotiating position is obvious, it has been stated and should not be changed: NATO’s return to its 1997 borders. Beyond that, various options are possible. Naturally, Trump will try to up the ante. So, we should act pre-emptively”, Professor Karaganov advises.
Recall too, that Trump is, at heart, a sworn disciple of the cult of American primacy; American greatness. “He will act accordingly … The Russians will dictate the terms of surrender in this [Ukraine] war because their strength affords them that privilege, and there is nothing the U.S. and its impotent European vassals can do to alter that reality. That said, a decisive strategic defeat is going to be a very bitter pill to swallow for this second Trump administration. Hopefully they won’t opt to set the world on fire in a fit of humiliated madness”.
